A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals
Open accessAbstract
Conditionals somehow express conditional beliefs. However, conditional belief is a bi‐propositional attitude that is generally not truth‐evaluable, in contrast to unconditional belief. Therefore, this article opts for an expressivistic semantics for conditionals, grounds this semantics in the arguably most adequate account of conditional belief, that is, ranking theory, and dismisses probability theory for that purpose, because probabilities cannot represent belief. Various expressive options are then explained in terms of ranking theory, with the intention to set out a general interpretive scheme that is able to account for the most variegated usage of conditionals. The Ramsey test is only the first option. Relevance is another, familiar, but little understood item, which comes in several versions. This article adds a further family of expressive options, which is able to subsume also counterfactuals and causal conditionals, and indicates at the end how this family allows for partial recovery of truth conditions for conditionals.
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- Authors
- Spohn, W.
- Affiliations
- University of Konstanz (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Spohn, Wolfgang
- ORCID
- Spohn, Wolfgang
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2013-08
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1074-1106
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2162937879
- Cited by
- 49
- References
- 72
- Citations by year
- 2025: 11 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 3
- FWCI
- 2.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- KOPS (University of Konstanz) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Language and Linguistics › Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- conditionals, ranking theory, conditional beliefs, expressivism, Ramsey test, relevance, counterfactuals, causal conditionals, truth conditions, probability theory
- MeSH terms
- Humans, Logic, Probability Learning, Probability Theory, Semantics, Models, Statistical, Comprehension
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