The Curse of Expertise: When More Knowledge Leads to Miscalibrated Explanatory Insight
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Does expertise within a domain of knowledge predict accurate self‐assessment of the ability to explain topics in that domain? We find that expertise increases confidence in the ability to explain a wide variety of phenomena. However, this confidence is unwarranted; after actually offering full explanations, people are surprised by the limitations in their understanding. For passive expertise (familiar topics), miscalibration is moderated by education; those with more education are accurate in their self‐assessments (Experiment 1). But when those with more education consider topics related to their area of concentrated study (college major), they also display an illusion of understanding (Experiment 2). This “curse of expertise” is explained by a failure to recognize the amount of detailed information that had been forgotten (Experiment 3). While expertise can sometimes lead to accurate self‐knowledge, it can also create illusions of competence.
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Cites
Why People Fail to Recognize Their Own Incompetence
Dunning, D., Johnson, K., Ehrlinger, J., & Kruger, J. (2003) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/1467-8721.01235 · Cited by 1,224
Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion of Understanding
Fernbach, P. M., Rogers, T., Fox, C. R., & Sloman, S. A. (2013) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797612464058 · Cited by 396
Illusions of Competence in Monitoring One's Knowledge During Study.
Koriat, A., & Bjork, R. A. (2005) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.31.2.187 · Cited by 362
Searching for explanations: How the Internet inflates estimates of internal knowledge.
Fisher, M., Goddu, M. K., & Keil, F. C. (2015) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/xge0000070 · Cited by 330
Self-citationMissing the trees for the forest: A construal level account of the illusion of explanatory depth.
Alter, A. L., Oppenheimer, D. M., & Zemla, J. C. (2010) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0020218 · Cited by 158
The calibration of expert judgment: heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory
Koehler, D. J., Brenner, L., & Griffin, D. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.041 · Cited by 146
Inability of trained nurses to perform basic life support
Wynne, G., Marteau, T. M., Johnston, M., Whiteley, C. A., & Evans, T. R. (1987) · BMJ · doi:10.1136/bmj.294.6581.1198 · Cited by 105
Cited by
The illusion of explanatory depth and endorsement of conspiracy beliefs
Vitriol, J. A., & Marsh, J. K. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2504 · Cited by 118
Your Understanding Is My Understanding: Evidence for a Community of Knowledge
Sloman, S. A., & Rabb, N. (2016) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797616662271 · Cited by 88
Danovitch, J. H., Fisher, M., Schroder, H., Hambrick, D. Z., & Moser, J. (2019) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/cdev.12960 · Cited by 50
Self-citationHarder Than You Think: How Outside Assistance Leads to Overconfidence
Fisher, M., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2021) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797620975779 · Cited by 31
Self-citationOverconfidence without Understanding: AI Explanations Increase the Illusion of Explanatory Depth
Aslanov, I., Felmer, P., & Guerra, E. (2025) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/8psgf_v1
Metadata
- Authors
- Fisher, M., & Keil, F. C.
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-09-15
- Volume
- 40
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1251-1269
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W2109558081
- Cited by
- 76
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 3.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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