The Puzzle of Belief
Open accessAbstract
The notion of belief appears frequently in cognitive science. Yet it has resisted definition of the sort that could clarify inquiry. How then might a cognitive science of belief proceed? Here we propose a form of pluralism about believing. According to this view, there are importantly different ways to "believe" an idea. These distinct psychological kinds occur within a multi‐dimensional property space, with different property clusters within that space constituting distinct varieties of believing. We propose that discovering such property clusters is empirically tractable, and that this approach can help sidestep merely verbal disputes about what constitutes “belief.”
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Access to real-time digital information improves analytical decision-making in some contexts.
“Access to real-time digital information was shown to improve analytical decision-making in some contexts [14].”
From Cognitive benefits and risks of digital technology engagement (2025) · cites this paper as [14]
The paper’s Abstract discusses the nature of belief and how it relates to memory and perception, not access to real-time digital information. Searches for digital information and improved decision-making found no passage addressing the claimed effect. (LLM, conf=0.76)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredData-saturated environments push users toward superficial decision-making.
“Heuristic Reliance: Data-saturated environments push users toward superficial decision-making [14], reflecting how cognitive overload triggers germane load depletion, forcing reliance on mental shortcuts particularly when evaluating multiple digital technologies.”
From Cognitive benefits and risks of digital technology engagement (2025) · cites this paper as [14]
The passages from “The Puzzle of Belief” (section labeled Abstract; page unavailable) discuss varieties of believing, not decisions in data-saturated environments. Searches for cognitive overload, superficial decision-making, heuristics, and digital technologies found no passage addressing the attributed claim. (LLM, conf=0.77)
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Leeuwen, N. V. (2014) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.015 · Cited by 277 · see citing works
Abelson, R. (1986) · Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.1986.tb00078.x · Cited by 260 · see citing works
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Sperber, D. (1997) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1997.tb00062.x · Cited by 233 · see citing works
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Scoboria, A., Jackson, D. L., Talarico, J., Hanczakowski, M., Wysman, L., & Mazzoni, G. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/a0034110 · Cited by 105 · see citing works
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Self-citationExplaining the existential: Scientific and religious explanations play different functional roles.
Davoodi, T., & Lombrozo, T. (2021) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/xge0001129 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Self-citationReligion as Make-Believe: A Theory of Belief, Imagination, and Group Identity
Fahira, Z. (2024) · International Journal for the Psychology of Religion · doi:10.1080/10508619.2024.2439112 · Cited by 19 · see citing works
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Leeuwen, N. V. (2022) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2022.939949 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
McGahhey, M., & Leeuwen, N. V. (2018) · Contributions to phenomenology · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_5 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
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Cognitive benefits and risks of digital technology engagement
Tsegaye Kassa, S. (2025) · Discover Psychology · doi:10.1007/s44202-025-00527-0 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
- Authors
- Van Leeuwen, N., & Lombrozo, T.
- Affiliations
- Department of Philosophy and Neuroscience Institute Georgia State University
- Princeton University (US)
- ORCID
- Lombrozo, Tania
- Venue
- Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2023-02
- Volume
- 47
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- e13245-e13245
- ISSN
- 0364-0213 (ISSN-L)
- 1551-6709
- OpenAlex
- W4319294363
- Cited by
- 32
- References
- 18
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 4
- FWCI
- 55.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Keywords
- belief, property space, epistemology of belief
- MeSH terms
- Humans, Cultural Diversity, Knowledge, Dissent and Disputes
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