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Cited by 105Memory Processes and InfluencesIdentity, Memory, and TherapyCognitive Functions and Memory

The role of belief in occurrence within autobiographical memory.

Open access
Scoboria, Alan, Jackson, Dennis L., Talarico, Jennifer, Hanczakowski, Maciej, Wysman, Lauren, Mazzoni, Giuliana·2014·Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
DOI 10.1037/a0034110
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Abstract

This article examines the idea that believing that events occurred in the past is a non-memorial decision that reflects underlying processes that are distinct from recollecting events. Research on autobiographical memory has often focused on events that are both believed to have occurred and remembered, thus tending to overlook the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection. Studying event representations such as false memories, believed-not-remembered events, and non-believed memories shows the influence of non-memorial processes on evaluations of occurrence. Believing that an event occurred and recollecting an event may be more strongly dissociated than previously stated. The relative independence of these constructs was examined in 2 studies. In Study 1, multiple events were cued, and then each was rated on autobiographical belief, recollection, and other memory characteristics. In Study 2, participants described a nonbelieved memory, a believed memory, and a believed-not-remembered event, and they made similar ratings. In both studies, structural equation modeling techniques revealed distinct belief and recollection latent variables. Modeling the predictors of these factors revealed a double dissociation: Perceptual, re-experiencing, and emotional features predicted recollection and not belief, whereas event plausibility strongly predicted belief and weakly predicted recollection. The results show that judgments of autobiographical belief and recollection are distinct, that each is influenced by different sources of information and processes, and that the strength of their relationship varies depending on the type of event under study. The concept of autobiographical belief is elaborated, and implications of the findings are discussed in relation to decision making about events, social influence on memory, metacognition, and recognition processes.

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  • Pre-experiencing vivid future events is not by itself enough to produce the sense that an event will occur in one's future; contextualization with high-level autobiographical knowledge is required, and comparable results hold for remembered past events.

    “Their results demonstrate that pre-experiencing vivid future events (i.e., future MTT) is not sufficient to convey the sense that the event will actually occur in one's future without this contextualization with autobiographical knowledge; similar findings are reported for remembered past events (Scoboria et al., 2014).”

    From Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation. (2020) · cites this paper as Scoboria et al., 2014

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  1. Lindsay, D. S. (2008). Source monitoring. In H. L. Roediger, III (Ed.), Cognitive psychology of memory: Vol. 2 of Learning and memory: A comprehensive reference (pp. 325-348). Oxford, England: Elsevier.
  2. Sacks, O. (2005). On memory. The Threepenny Review. Retrieved from http://www.threepennyreview.com/samples/sacks_w05.html
  3. Hancock, G.R., & Mueller, R.O. (2001). Rethinking construct reliability within latent variable systems. In R. Cudeck, S. du Toit, & D. Sörbom (Eds.), Structural Equation Modeling: Present and Future -A Festschrift in honor of Karl Jöreskog. Lincolnwood, IL: Scientific Software International, Inc.
  4. Marsh, H. W., & Grayson, D. (1995). Latent variable models of multitrait-multimethod data. In R. H. Hoyle (Ed.) Structural equation modeling: Concepts, issues, and applications (pp. 177-198). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
  5. Satorra, A., & Bentler, P.M. (1994). Corrections to test statistics and standard errors in covariance structure analysis. Proceedings of the Business and Economic Statistics Section of the American Statistical Association, 308-313.

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Authors
Scoboria, A., Jackson, D. L., Talarico, J., Hanczakowski, M., Wysman, L., & Mazzoni, G.
Affiliations
  • University of Windsor (CA)
  • Lafayette College (US)
  • University of Hull (GB)
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
Publisher
American Psychological Association (APA)
Published
2014-06
Volume
143
Issue
3
Pages
1242-1258
ISSN
  • 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-2222
DOI
10.1037/a0034110
OpenAlex
W2131499562
Cited by
105
References
121
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 11 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 2 · 2012: 1
FWCI
4.55
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • Journal of Experimental Psychology General (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Repository@Hull (Worktribe) (University of Hull) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • Repository@Hull (Worktribe) (University of Hull) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • ORCA Online Research @Cardiff (Cardiff University) (submittedVersion)
  • IRIS Research product catalog (Sapienza University of Rome) (submittedVersion)
Funders
Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Identity, Memory, and Therapy
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Cognitive Functions and Memory
Keywords
autobiographical memory, recollection, false memory, re-experiencing, emotional arousal, metacognition, social influence on memory, recognition processes
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Adult, Female, Humans, Male, Mental Recall, Young Adult, Memory, Episodic

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