The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Has Agency Theory Run its Course?: Making the Theory more Flexible to Inform the Management of Reward Systems
Abstract
Manuscript Type: Conceptual Research Question/Issue: In this paper we discuss three assumptions of agency theory: (1) conflicts of interest between principal and agent, (2) nature of risk, and (3) the proposed internal mechanisms to reduce agency costs. We review criticisms of agency theory's pessimistic assumptions of human behavior and its simplistic view about individual risk preferences to argue how the context may influence both the interest and mechanisms for aligning interest of principals and agents. Research Findings/Insights: We draw on alternative theoretical perspectives from behavioral and organizational sciences to describe circumstances under which honesty, loyalty, and trust in agents' behaviors are possible and also the development of cooperative rather than contentious relationships. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study explores the boundary conditions of traditional agency theory in the hope of extending agency theory outside its current contextual boundaries. In doing so, we provide a more robust and exhaustive view of the economic exchange between principals and agents. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to managers about how intrinsic incentives may provide an alternative mechanism of control over agents' behavior to extrinsic incentives prescribed by traditional agency theory. Indeed, intrinsic incentives of personal satisfaction and identification with organizational objects, combined with implicit social obligations and reciprocity may, under certain circumstances, provide stronger restraints on agent opportunism than the use of traditional extrinsic rewards in the form of incentive alignment.
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Cites
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Suchman, M. C. (1995) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258788 · Cited by 19,903
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An integrative model of organizational trust
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. (1995) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/258792 · Cited by 10,736
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Investor protection and corporate governance
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The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications
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Cited by
Accounting and auditing with blockchain technology and artificial Intelligence: A literature review
Han, H., Shiwakoti, R. K., Jarvis, R., Mordi, C., & Botchie, D. (2023) · International Journal of Accounting Information Systems · doi:10.1016/j.accinf.2022.100598 · Cited by 575
Beattie, V. (2014) · The British Accounting Review · doi:10.1016/j.bar.2014.05.001 · Cited by 365
Metadata
- Authors
- Cuevas‐Rodríguez, G., Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., & Wiseman, R. M.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-10
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 526-546
- ISSN
- 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8683
- OpenAlex
- W1901910762
- Cited by
- 237
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 31.35
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Cuevas‐Rodríguez, G., Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., & Wiseman, R. M. (2012). Has Agency Theory Run its Course?: Making the Theory more Flexible to Inform the Management of Reward Systems. Corporate Governance: An International Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12004
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.