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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Has Agency Theory Run its Course?: Making the Theory more Flexible to Inform the Management of Reward Systems

Cuevas‐Rodríguez, Gloria, Gomez‐Mejia, Luis R., Wiseman, Robert M. · 2012 · Corporate Governance: An International Review

Abstract

Manuscript Type: Conceptual Research Question/Issue: In this paper we discuss three assumptions of agency theory: (1) conflicts of interest between principal and agent, (2) nature of risk, and (3) the proposed internal mechanisms to reduce agency costs. We review criticisms of agency theory's pessimistic assumptions of human behavior and its simplistic view about individual risk preferences to argue how the context may influence both the interest and mechanisms for aligning interest of principals and agents. Research Findings/Insights: We draw on alternative theoretical perspectives from behavioral and organizational sciences to describe circumstances under which honesty, loyalty, and trust in agents' behaviors are possible and also the development of cooperative rather than contentious relationships. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study explores the boundary conditions of traditional agency theory in the hope of extending agency theory outside its current contextual boundaries. In doing so, we provide a more robust and exhaustive view of the economic exchange between principals and agents. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to managers about how intrinsic incentives may provide an alternative mechanism of control over agents' behavior to extrinsic incentives prescribed by traditional agency theory. Indeed, intrinsic incentives of personal satisfaction and identification with organizational objects, combined with implicit social obligations and reciprocity may, under certain circumstances, provide stronger restraints on agent opportunism than the use of traditional extrinsic rewards in the form of incentive alignment.

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Crossref · 10.1111/corg.12004

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Metadata

Authors
Cuevas‐Rodríguez, G., Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., & Wiseman, R. M.
Venue
Corporate Governance: An International Review
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2012-10
Volume
20
Issue
6
Pages
526-546
ISSN
  • 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-8683
OpenAlex
W1901910762
Cited by
237
References
13
FWCI
31.35
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Has Agency Theory Run its Course?: Making the Theory more Flexible to Inform the Management of Reward Systems. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/corg.12004
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Cuevas‐Rodríguez, G., Gomez‐Mejia, L. R., & Wiseman, R. M. (2012). Has Agency Theory Run its Course?: Making the Theory more Flexible to Inform the Management of Reward Systems. Corporate Governance: An International Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12004

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.