Cited by 21Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in DataDigital Media Forensic Detection

Clean‐label poisoning attacks on federated learning for IoT

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Yang, Jie, Zheng, Jun, Baker, Thar, Tang, Shuai, Tan, Yu‐an, Zhang, Quanxin·2023·Expert Systems

Abstract

Abstract Federated Learning (FL) is suitable for the application scenarios of distributed edge collaboration of the Internet of Things (IoT). It can provide data security and privacy, which is why it is widely used in the IoT applications such as Industrial IoT (IIoT). Latest research shows that the federated learning framework is vulnerable to poisoning attacks in the case of an active attack by the adversary. However, the existing backdoor attack methods are easy to be detected by the defence methods. To address this challenge, we focus on edge‐cloud synergistic FL clean‐label attacks. Unlike common backdoor attack, to ensure the attack's concealment, we add a small perturbation to realize the clean label attack by judging the cosine similarity between the gradient of the adversarial loss and the gradient of the normal training loss. In order to improve the attack success rate and robustness, the attack is implemented when the global model is about to converge. The experimental results verified that 1% of poisoned data could make an attack successful with a high probability. Our method maintains stealth while performing model poisoning attacks, and the average Peak Signal‐to‐Noise Ratio (PSNR) of poisoning images reaches over 30 dB, and the average Structural SIMilarity (SSIM) is close to 0.93. Most importantly, our attack method can bypass the Byzantine aggregation defence.

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Authors
Yang, J., Zheng, J., Baker, T., Tang, S., Tan, Y., & Zhang, Q.
Affiliations
  • Beijing Institute of Technology (CN)
  • University of Sharjah (AE)
Corresponding author
  • Baker, Thar
  • Zhang, Quanxin
Venue
Expert Systems
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2022-10-12
Volume
40
Issue
5
ISSN
  • 0266-4720 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0394
OpenAlex
W4304782753
Cited by
20
References
24
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 2
FWCI
1.23
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Expert Systems (publishedVersion, public-domain)
  • University of Brighton Repository (University of Brighton) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
  • National Key Research and Development Program of China (2020YFB1712101)
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (62072037, U1936218)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
Keywords
federated learning, backdoor attacks, Internet of Things, Industrial Internet of Things, attack stealth, adversarial perturbations, gradient-based attacks, model poisoning

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