Cited by 132China's Socioeconomic Reforms and GovernanceCorruption and Economic DevelopmentPublic Administration and Governance

The C hinese Paradox of High Growth and Low Quality of Government: The Cadre Organization Meets Max Weber

Rothstein, Bo·2015·Governance

Abstract

Much research has argued for the importance of state's administrative capacity for development. Disregard for the rule of law and failure to get corruption under control are seen as detrimental to economic and social development. The China paradox refers to the fact that in all commonly used measures of levels of corruption and the quality of government, China is a country that scores quite low. China also lacks the Weberian model of bureaucracy that is seen as central for development. It is argued that this paradox is the result of disregarding the existence of a different public administration model in China—the cadre organization. Instead of rule following, this organization is marked by high commitment to a specific policy doctrine. The argument is that while very different from Weberian bureaucracy, this organization is well suited for effectively implementing policies for economic and social development.

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Crossref · 10.1111/gove.12128

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  • Other state-fragile factors such as demographic, legal, and business regulation also significantly affect institutional quality.

    “However, mere corruption is not responsible for institutions' deterioration [70] because other State-fragile factors such as demographic, legal, and business regulation also significantly affect institutional quality.”

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Authors
Rothstein, B.
Affiliations
University of Gothenburg (SE)
Corresponding author
Rothstein, Bo
Venue
Governance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2014-11-04
Volume
28
Issue
4
Pages
533-548
ISSN
  • 0952-1895 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0491
OpenAlex
W1960895089
Cited by
132
References
63
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 14 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 3
FWCI
58.64
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Governance (publishedVersion)
Funders
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Sweden (M2006-0760:1-PK)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Public Administration and Governance
Keywords
Max Weber, Weberian bureaucracy, administrative capacity, governance quality, corruption, rule of law, public administration models, policy implementation, economic development, Chinese Communist Party

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