The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collective Reputation and Quality
Abstract
Firms who sell regional or specialty products often share a collective reputation based on aggregate quality. Collective reputation can be approached as a dynamic common property resource problem. We show that for an experience good without firm traceability, individual firms have the incentive to choose quality levels that are sub‐optimal for the group. These results support minimum quality standards. Trigger strategies are analyzed as an alternative solution to this problem. Finally, the implications of these results are discussed as they relate to the case study of Washington apples.
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Cites
The Theory of Industrial Organization
Jean Tirole, Z. (1988) · MIT Press Books · Cited by 8,651
Information and Consumer Behavior
Nelson, P. (1970) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259630 · Cited by 5,758
Theory of Industrial Organization.
Rubinstein, A., & Tirole, J. (1989) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554286 · Cited by 5,142
Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947
Reputation and imperfect information
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8 · Cited by 3,087
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x · Cited by 1,846
Modern industrial organization
Carlton, D. W., & Perloff, J. M. (1990) · Cited by 1,707
Differential Games in Economics and Management Science
Dockner, E. J., Jørgensen, S., Long, N. V., & Sorger, G. (2000) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511805127 · Cited by 1,556
Tirole, J. (1996) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2298112 · Cited by 1,065
Cited by
Loureiro, M. L., & Umberger, W. J. (2007) · Food Policy · doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2006.11.006 · Cited by 672
Concentration and market power in the food chain
(2021) · OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers · doi:10.1787/3151e4ca-en · Cited by 53
Metadata
- Authors
- Winfree, J. A., & McCluskey, J. J.
- Venue
- American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-02
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 206-213
- ISSN
- 0002-9092 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8276
- OpenAlex
- W2149084163
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 21.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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