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Cited by 408Employment, Labor, and Gender StudiesLabor market dynamics and wage inequalityLabor Movements and Unions

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 58 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 12 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Why Has Work Effort Become More Intense?

Open access
Green, Francis·2004·Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society

Abstract

It is hypothesized that technological and organizational changes are an important source of work intensification, and supportive evidence is found using establishment data for Britain in the 1990s. Work intensification has also been stimulated by the use of high‐commitment human resources policies. A reduction in union power and a rise in the use of temporary agency workers and contractors were positively associated with work intensification; however, their impact during the 1990s was modest.

Overview

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TL;DR

Using British establishment data from WERS98, Green argues that work intensification in the 1990s was driven mainly by effort-biased technological and organizational change, with high-commitment HR policies also contributing. Declining union power and greater use of non-standard workers had only modest effects.

Key findings

  • Technological and organizational change was the most important identified source of intensification: 46% of managers reported new technology/techniques/procedures and work organization changes, while only 11% reported none. Within-sample predictions show that with no technological change, the probability that effort “gone up a lot” falls from 40% to 23% in small establishments and from 44% to 26% in large establishments; if technological change were universal, it rises to 51% in both.
  • High-commitment policies also mattered: removing employee involvement and performance-related pay lowers the predicted probability of effort “gone up a lot” from 40% to 32% in small establishments and from 44% to 43% in large establishments.
  • Declining union power and non-standard labor had weaker effects: collective bargaining decline was confined to 5% of establishments (10% of employees), and union decline made virtually no difference in predictions; temporary agency workers and contractors were significantly associated with intensification, but fixed-term and part-time workers were not.
  • Public-sector intensification was greater: managers reporting effort “gone up a lot” were 49.0% in the public sector versus 36.3% in the private sector; worker representatives reported 66.6% versus 50.8%. Table 1 shows private-sector strong agreement that the job requires working very hard rose from 31.5% in 1992 to 38.2% in 1997, while public-sector agreement rose from 31.9% to 44.3%, with no significant change after 1997.

Methods

  • Uses the cross-section component of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS98), a random sample of British establishments with at least 10 workers; 2,191 management interviews were completed (80% response rate) and 947 worker representative interviews (82% response rate), with usable effort responses for 1,934 establishments.
  • The dependent variable is managers’ 5-point report of change over the previous five years in how hard people work; estimation is by ordered probit of a first-difference equation including technological change, high-commitment policies, union decline, and changes in non-standard labor use.
  • Robustness checks use worker representatives’ effort reports and external consistency checks; the industry-level correlation between WERS98 intensification and independent 1992–1997 effort-change measures is 0.681.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the effort-intensification data are subjective, findings should not be regarded as definitive, and they await confirmation from other data sets with other effort measures; it also notes possible omitted variables, recall error, and that supply-side shifts are not empirically evaluated.
  • The paper states that future returns to current effort are hard to estimate from contemporary earnings functions, limiting assessment of wage–effort links.
  • Evident from the text: the cross-sectional first-difference design cannot establish causality; the analysis is limited to Britain in the 1990s; manager and worker representative perceptions differ (Spearman correlation 0.101); and the union-decline measure is rare and refers to collective bargaining over pay rather than effort directly.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.0019-8676.2004.00359.x

Cites

58 of 58 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

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Verification

Claims the paper makes

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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 60 references

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. 10.1177/09500179922117980 · DOI
  2. 10.1023/a:1016901315958 · DOI
  3. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 1997, Working Conditions in the European Union
  4. Felstead Alan, Duncan, 2002, Work Skills in Britain 1986–2001
  5. 10.2307/2525113 · DOI
  6. Internal Revenue Service (IRS, 1996, “Working Harder, Working Longer: Managers’ Attitudes to Work Revisited.”, IRS Employment Review, 600
  7. London Hazards Centre, 1994, Hard Labor
  8. Roach Stephen S, 1996, “The Hollow Ring of the Productivity Revival.”, Harvard Business Review, 74, 81
  9. 10.1177/0950017097113005 · DOI

Cited by

Items 201–300 of 408

Metadata

Authors
Green, F.
Affiliations
University of Kent (GB)
Corresponding author
Green, Francis
Venue
Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2004-09-08
Volume
43
Issue
4
Pages
709-741
ISSN
  • 0019-8676 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-232X
OpenAlex
W1571053481
Cited by
408
References
60
Citations by year
2026: 19 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 32 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 15 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 21 · 2017: 17 · 2016: 17 · 2015: 21 · 2014: 17 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 22
FWCI
38.73
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Industrial Relations A Journal of Economy and Society (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
  • Studies in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
  • Kent Academic Repository (University of Kent) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Aarhus Universitet
  • Leverhulme Trust
  • University of Oxford
  • Economic and Social Research Council
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Industrial relations › Employment, Labor, and Gender Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Labor market dynamics and wage inequality
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Industrial relations › Labor Movements and Unions
Keywords
work intensification, work effort, technological change, organizational change, union power, temporary agency workers, contractors

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