The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
I *-ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY, METAPHYSICAL MODALITY AND COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING
Abstract
A striking feature of the traditional armchair method of philosophy is the use of imaginary examples: for instance, of Gettier cases as counterexamples to the justified true belief analysis of knowledge. The use of such examples is often thought to involve some sort of a priori rational intuition, which crude rationalists regard as a virtue and crude empiricists as a vice. It is argued here that, on the contrary, what is involved is simply an application of our general cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals, which is not exclusively a priori and is not usefully conceived as a form of rational intuition. It is explained how questions of metaphysical possibility and necessity are equivalent to questions about counterfactuals, and the epistemology of the former (in particular, the role of conceiving or imagining) is a special case of the epistemology of the latter. A non-imaginary Gettier case is presented in order to show how little difference it makes.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Stalnaker, R. C. (1968) · IFS · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_2 · Cited by 2,220
Cited by
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction
Rosen, G. (2010) · Modality · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007 · Cited by 1,285
THE RISE AND FALL OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Kauppinen, A. (2007) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790701305871 · Cited by 324
Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy
Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2007) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00048.x · Cited by 297
Metadata
- Authors
- Williamson, T.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-06
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-23
- ISSN
- 0066-7374 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9264
- OpenAlex
- W1968645815
- Cited by
- 173
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 49.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: I *-ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY, METAPHYSICAL MODALITY AND COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x
- The paper
- Williamson, T. (2005). I *-ARMCHAIR PHILOSOPHY, METAPHYSICAL MODALITY AND COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00100.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.