The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy
Abstract
It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought‐experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement – experimental philosophy – has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introduce two different views concerning the relationship that holds between experimental philosophy and the future of standard philosophical practice (what we call, the proper foundation view and the restrictionist view ), discuss some of the more interesting and important results obtained by proponents of both views, and examine the pressure these results put on analytic philosophers to reform standard philosophical practice. We will also defend experimental philosophy from some recent objections, suggest future directions for work in experimental philosophy, and suggest what future lines of epistemological response might be available to those wishing to defend analytic epistemology from the challenges posed by experimental philosophy.
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Citations
Cites
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Gettier, E. L. (1963) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/23.6.121 · Cited by 3,127
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Semantics, cross-cultural style
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Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions
Nichols, S., & Knobe, J. (2007) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x · Cited by 558
Cited by
Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology
Nagel, J. (2012) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00634.x · Cited by 337
Cullen, S. (2010) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-009-0016-1 · Cited by 225
“In their seminal contribution to the " restrictionist programme " (Alexander and Weinberg 2007), Weinberg et al. (2006) characterised philosophers who rely on their own intuitions to support normative philosophical claims as " Intuition Driven Romanticists " .”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M.
- Venue
- Philosophy Compass
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-11-21
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 56-80
- ISSN
- 1747-9991 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2078154654
- Cited by
- 297
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 65.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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