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Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy

Alexander, Joshua, Weinberg, Jonathan M. · 2007 · Philosophy Compass

Abstract

It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought‐experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement – experimental philosophy – has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introduce two different views concerning the relationship that holds between experimental philosophy and the future of standard philosophical practice (what we call, the proper foundation view and the restrictionist view ), discuss some of the more interesting and important results obtained by proponents of both views, and examine the pressure these results put on analytic philosophers to reform standard philosophical practice. We will also defend experimental philosophy from some recent objections, suggest future directions for work in experimental philosophy, and suggest what future lines of epistemological response might be available to those wishing to defend analytic epistemology from the challenges posed by experimental philosophy.

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Metadata

Authors
Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M.
Venue
Philosophy Compass
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2006-11-21
Volume
2
Issue
1
Pages
56-80
ISSN
1747-9991 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2078154654
Cited by
297
References
29
FWCI
65.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00048.x
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Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2007). Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00048.x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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