The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?
Abstract
Recent work in comparative politics and international relations has shown a marked shift toward leaders as the theoretical unit of analysis. In most of the new theoretical models a core assumption is that leaders act to stay in power. There exists, however, remarkably little systematic empirical knowledge about the factors that affect the tenure of leaders. To provide a baseline of empirical results we explore how a broad range of domestic and international factors affects the tenure of leaders. We focus in particular on the effect of conflict and its outcome. We find that political institutions fundamentally mediate the costs and benefits of international conflict and that war is not necessarily ex post inefficient for leaders. This suggests that the assumption that war is ex post inefficient for unitary rational actors can not be simply extended to leaders. Therefore, a focus on leaders may yield important new rationalist explanations for war.
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Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve
Weeks, J. L. (2008) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818308080028 · Cited by 828
Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach
Tomz, M. (2007) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818307070282 · Cited by 699
Baum, M. A., & Potter, P. B. K. (2008) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.060406.214132 · Cited by 600
Powell, R. (2006) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818306060061 · Cited by 585
The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory
ROSATO, S. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000893 · Cited by 535
Metadata
- Authors
- Chiozza, G., & Goemans, H. E.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-06-08
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 604-619
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2127866940
- Cited by
- 271
- References
- 54
- FWCI
- 32.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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