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II—Martin Davies: Epistemic Entitlement, Warrant Transmission and Easy Knowledge
Abstract
Wright's account of sceptical arguments and his use of the idea of epistemic entitlement are reviewed. His notion of non-transmission of epistemic warrant is explained and a concern about his notion of entitlement is developed. An epistemological framework different from Wright's is described and several notions of entitlement are introduced. One of these, negative entitlement, is selected for more detailed comparison with Wright's notion. Thereafter, the paper shows how the two notions of entitlement have contrasting consequences for non-transmission of warrant and how they go naturally with two conceptions of the presuppositions of epistemic projects. Problems for negative entitlement are explained and solutions are proposed.
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Citations
Cited by
Pritchard, D. (2005) · doi:10.1093/019928038x.001.0001 · Cited by 874
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?
Pryor, J. (2004) · Philosophical Issues · doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x · Cited by 705
The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations
Pritchard, D., Millar, A., & Haddock, A. (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199586264.001.0001 · Cited by 454
White, R. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-004-7487-9 · Cited by 263
Common Sense as Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and Skepticism
KELLY, T. (2008) · Midwest Studies In Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2008.00165.x · Cited by 105
Metadata
- Authors
- Davies, M.
- Venue
- Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-07-01
- Volume
- 78
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 213-245
- ISSN
- 0309-7013 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8349
- OpenAlex
- W2060949343
- Cited by
- 234
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 73.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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