Believe It or Not: On the Possibility of Suspending Belief
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We present two experiments that cast doubt on existing evidence suggesting that it is impossible to suspend belief in a comprehended proposition. In Experiment 1, we found that interrupting the encoding of a statement's veracity decreased memory for the statement's falsity when the false version of the statement was uninformative, but not when the false version was informative. This suggests that statements that are informative when false are not represented as if they were true. In Experiment 2, participants made faster lexical decisions to words implied by preceding statements when they were told that the statements were true than when the veracity of the statements was unknown or when the statements were false. The findings suggest that comprehending a statement may not require believing it, and that it may be possible to suspend belief in comprehended propositions.
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Cites
Savings in the relearning of trait information as evidence for spontaneous inference generation
Carlston, D. E., & Skowronski, J. J. (1994) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.66.5.840 · Cited by 334
Cited by
Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and Successful Debiasing
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, N., & Cook, J. (2012) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1177/1529100612451018 · Cited by 2,920
SPERBER, D., CLÉMENT, F., HEINTZ, C., MASCARO, O., MERCIER, H., ORIGGI, G., & WILSON, D. (2010) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01394.x · Cited by 1,795
Spontaneous Inferences, Implicit Impressions, and Implicit Theories
Uleman, J. S., Adil Saribay, S., & Gonzalez, C. M. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093707 · Cited by 505
Knowing when to doubt: Developing a critical stance when learning from others.
Mills, C. M. (2013) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0029500 · Cited by 372
Implicit ambivalence from attitude change: An exploration of the PAST model.
Petty, R. E., Tormala, Z. L., Briñol, P., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (2006) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.90.1.21 · Cited by 359
Metadata
- Authors
- Hasson, U., Simmons, J. P., & Todorov, A.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2005-07
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 566-571
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W1976354401
- Cited by
- 127
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 21.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Hasson, U., Simmons, J. P., & Todorov, A. (2005). Believe It or Not: On the Possibility of Suspending Belief. Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01576.x
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