The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK
Open accessAbstract
We investigate the investment-cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow-sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment-cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non-monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.
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Cites
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Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408 · cited 2×
“13 In the UK literature, we find that the following cut off points are chosen: 14% and 42% in Short and Keasey (1999), 13% and 30% in Mudambi and Nicosia (1998), and 20% and 54% in Faccio and Lasfer (1999).”
17. A Value for n-Person Games
Shapley, L. S. (1953) · Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-28), Volume II · doi:10.1515/9781400881970-018 · Cited by 6,950
Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment
Fazzari, S. M., Hubbard, R. G., Petersen, B. C., Blinder, A. S., & Poterba, J. M. (1988) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.2307/2534426 · Cited by 5,574
Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1980) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003400 · Cited by 3,098 · cited 3×
“Since a shareholder internalizes the entire cost related to her control efforts but benefits only in proportion to her share stake (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Demsetz, 1983), monitoring will only be cost effective if this shareholder (or a coalition of shareholders) becomes sufficiently large.6…”
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
Holmström, B., & Tirole, J. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261893 · Cited by 1,719
Dynamic Investment Models and the Firm's Financial Policy
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Working Capital and Fixed Investment: New Evidence on Financing Constraints
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“Fazzari and Petersen (1993) provide further support for the liquidity constraints hypothesis of FHP (1988) by analysing the role of working capital as a use of funds.”
Background
Cited by
The effects of financialization on investment: evidence from firm-level data for the UK
Tori, D., & Onaran, Ö. (2018) · Cambridge Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/cje/bex085 · Cited by 324
What do we know about entrepreneurial finance and its relationship with growth?
Fraser, S., Bhaumik, S. K., & Wright, M. (2015) · International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurship · doi:10.1177/0266242614547827 · Cited by 293
Zhai, Y., Cai, Z., Lin, H., Yuan, M., Mao, Y., & Yu, M. (2022) · Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management · doi:10.1002/csr.2288 · Cited by 257
Metadata
- Authors
- Pawlina, G., & Renneboog, L.
- Venue
- European Financial Management
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2005-09
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 483-513
- ISSN
- 1354-7798 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-036X
- OpenAlex
- W3068055312
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 33.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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