The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
COMPETING PAYMENT SCHEMES*
Open accessAbstract
This paper presents a model of competing payment schemes. Unlike previous work on generic two‐sided markets, the model allows for the fact that in a payment system, users on one side of the market (merchants) compete to attract users on the other side (consumers, who may use cards for purchases). It analyzes how competition between card associations and between merchants affects the choice of interchange fees, and thus the structure of fees charged to cardholders and merchants. Implications for other two‐sided markets are discussed.
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Citations
Cites
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642 · cited 5×
“It analyzes how competition between card associations and between merchants affects the choice of interchange fees, and thus the structure of fees charged to cardholders and merchants.”
InfluentialChicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers
Caillaud, B., & Jullien, B. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593720 · Cited by 1,799 · cited 1×
“These include Armstrong (2002), Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Parker and Van Alstyne (2000), and Schiff (2003). higher to the extent there is competition between merchants.”
Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts
Armstrong, M., & Wright, J. (2007) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0114-6 · Cited by 690
Self-citationPricing and commitment by two-sided platforms
Hagiu, A. (2006) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00039.x · Cited by 526
Cited by
A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms
Weyl, E. G. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1642 · Cited by 737
One-sided Logic in Two-sided Markets
Wright, J. (2004) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1042 · Cited by 298
Self-citationThe Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses
Evans, D., & Schmalensee, R. (2013) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w18783 · Cited by 263
Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey
Roson, R. (2005) · Review of Network Economics · doi:10.2202/1446-9022.1070 · Cited by 262
Trabucchi, D., & Buganza, T. (2022) · European Journal of Innovation Management · doi:10.1108/ejim-11-2020-0467 · Cited by 83
Metadata
- Authors
- GUTHRIE, G., & WRIGHT, J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-03
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 37-67
- ISSN
- 0022-1821 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6451
- OpenAlex
- W2115564125
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 40.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- GUTHRIE, G., & WRIGHT, J. (2007). COMPETING PAYMENT SCHEMES*. The Journal of Industrial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00302.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.