The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CONTRACTING FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM U.S. CITIES*
Abstract
Local governments can provide services with their own employees or by contracting with private or public sector providers. We develop a model of this ‘make‐or‐buy’ choice that highlights the trade‐off between productive efficiency and the costs of contract administration. We construct a dataset of service provision choices by U.S. cities and identify a range of service and city characteristics as significant determinants of contracting decisions. Our analysis suggests an important role for economic efficiency concerns, as well as politics, in contracting for government services.
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Cites
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The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons
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Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts
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Self-citationMeasurement Cost and the Organization of Markets
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Cited by
Damanpour, F., & Schneider, M. (2009) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mun021 · Cited by 931
Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression
Williamson, O. E. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.673 · Cited by 692
Contracting or Public Delivery? The Importance of Service, Market, and Management Characteristics
Hefetz, A., & Warner, M. E. (2012) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mur006 · Cited by 424
Creating and Capturing Value in Public-Private Ties: A Private Actor's Perspective
Kivleniece, I., & Quelin, B. V. (2012) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2011.0004 · Cited by 389
The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships
IOSSA, E., & MARTIMORT, D. (2015) · Journal of Public Economic Theory · doi:10.1111/jpet.12114 · Cited by 344
Metadata
- Authors
- LEVIN, J., & TADELIS, S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-09
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 507-541
- ISSN
- 0022-1821 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6451
- OpenAlex
- W2093847394
- Cited by
- 371
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 63.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- LEVIN, J., & TADELIS, S. (2010). CONTRACTING FOR GOVERNMENT SERVICES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM U.S. CITIES*. The Journal of Industrial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00430.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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