The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships
Abstract
We build on the existing literature in public‐private partnerships (PPP) to analyze the main incentive issues in PPPs and the shape of optimal contracts in those contexts. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk‐averse firm chooses noncontractible efforts in cost reduction and quality improvement. We first consider the effect on incentives and risk transfer of bundling building and management stages into a single contract, allowing for different assumptions on feasible contracts and information available to the government. Then we extend the model in novel directions. We study the relationship between the operator and its financiers and the impact of private finance. We discuss the trade‐off between incentive and flexibility in PPP agreements and the dynamics of PPPs, including cost overruns. We also consider how institutions, and specifically the risk of regulatory opportunism, affect contract design and incentives. The conclusion summarizes policy implications on the desirability of PPPs.
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Cites
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Jean Tirole, Z., & Laffont, J. (1993) · Toulouse Capitole Publications (University Toulouse 1 Capitole) · Cited by 3,154
A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation
Ireland, N. (1994) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-7187(94)90034-5 · Cited by 2,554
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Laffont, J.-J., & Martimort, D. (2002) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400829453 · Cited by 2,106
Self-citationThe Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model
Laffont, J., & Martimort, D. (2001) · Toulouse 1 Capitole Publications (Université Toulouse I Capitole) · Cited by 2,049
Self-citationState versus private ownership
Shleifer, A. (1998) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.12.4.133 · Cited by 1,266
Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts
Bajari, P., & Tadelis, S. (2001) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2696361 · Cited by 1,098
Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects:Error or Lie?
Flyvbjerg, B., Holm, M. S., & Buhl, S. (2002) · Journal of the American Planning Association · doi:10.1080/01944360208976273 · Cited by 1,046
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Cited by
The Incremental Demise of Urban Green Spaces
Colding, J., Gren, Å., & Barthel, S. (2020) · Land · doi:10.3390/land9050162 · Cited by 126
Metadata
- Authors
- IOSSA, E., & MARTIMORT, D.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-01-22
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 4-48
- ISSN
- 1097-3923 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9779
- OpenAlex
- W1566231045
- Cited by
- 344
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 85.55
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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