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Intention, intentional action and moral considerations
Open accessAbstract
Adams, F. 1986. Intention and intentional action: the simple view. Mind and Language 1: 281–301. Adams, F. 1997. Cognitive trying. In Contemporary Action Theory, vol. 1, ed. G. Holmstron-Hintikka and R. Tuomela, 287–314. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby. 1994. The Adapted Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Ways of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Harman, G. 1976. Practical reasoning. Review of Metaphysics 29: 431–63. Knobe, J. 2003a. Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis 63: 190–94. Knobe, J. 2003b. Intentional action in folk psychology: an experimental investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16: 309–24. Malle, B. and J. Knobe. 1997. The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33: 101–21. Malle, B., L. Moses and D. Baldwin, eds. 2001. Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford. McCann, H. 1986. Rationality and the range of intention. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 191–211. Mele, A. 1992. Springs of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mele, A. 2001. Acting intentionally: probing folk notions. In Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition, ed. B. Malle, L. Moses and D. Baldwin, 27–43. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford. Mele, A. and S. Sverdlik. 1996. Intention, intentional action, and moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 82: 265–87.
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Cited by
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches
LUDWIG, K. (2007) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00160.x · Cited by 384
Person as scientist, person as moralist
Knobe, J. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000907 · Cited by 375
Self-citationAre liars ethical? On the tension between benevolence and honesty
Levine, E. E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2014) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2014.03.005 · Cited by 334
Acting Intentionally and the Side-Effect Effect: Theory of Mind and Moral Judgment
Leslie, A. M., Knobe, J., & Cohen, A. (2006) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01722.x · Cited by 330
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Metadata
- Authors
- Knobe, J.
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-04
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 282
- Pages
- 181-187
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W2034925628
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 105.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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