The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Effect of the Board Composition and its Monitoring Committees on Earnings Management: evidence from Spain
Abstract
We test whether corporate governance mechanisms promoted by best practice codes are effective in constraining earnings manipulation for a Spanish sample of quoted companies during the period 1999–2001. In particular, we analyse the association between earnings management and two key aspects of corporate governance: board composition and the existence of board monitoring committees. Our results show that board composition significantly determines earnings manipulation practices. However, the main role in constraining such practices is not played by independent directors, as UK and US based research suggests, but by institutional directors. No correlation is found between the existence of an independent audit committee and earnings management measures. Finally, the existence and composition of a nomination committee affects the role of independent directors in constraining earnings manipulation.
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Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Cited by
Corporate governance, accounting and finance: A review
Brown, P., Beekes, W., & Verhoeven, P. (2011) · Accounting & Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1467-629x.2010.00385.x · Cited by 614
Fuente, J. A., García-Sánchez, I. M., & Lozano, M. B. (2017) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.09.155 · Cited by 484
Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets?
Sáenz González, J., & García-Meca, E. (2014) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-013-1700-8 · Cited by 472
Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Meta‐Analysis
García‐Meca, E., & Sánchez‐Ballesta, J. P. (2009) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00753.x · Cited by 391
Board Independence and Real Earnings Management: The Case of R&D Expenditure
Osma, B. G. (2008) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00672.x · Cited by 266
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Metadata
- Authors
- Osma, B. G., & Noguer, B. G.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-11
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1413-1428
- ISSN
- 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8683
- OpenAlex
- W1955876547
- Cited by
- 218
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 29.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Osma, B. G., & Noguer, B. G. (2007). The Effect of the Board Composition and its Monitoring Committees on Earnings Management: evidence from Spain. Corporate Governance: An International Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00654.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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