The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Audit Committee and Firm Value: Evidence on Outside Top Executives as Expert‐Independent Directors
Abstract
Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: We examine the relation between independence of audit committee and firm value with a sample of Fortune 200 companies. Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of Fortune 200 companies and defining top executives of other publicly traded firms as expert‐independent directors and controlling for firm specifics, board features, and individual director characteristics, we find the presence of expert‐independent directors on board and in the audit committee enhances firm value. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We provide empirical evidence to show that by focusing on this restricted definition of independent directors (expert‐independent directors), we are able to examine independence in both the board and audit committee in a different light. Practitioner/Policy Implications: We offer new insights to relate firm value of the composition of audit committee. When expert‐independent directors are of majority control of audit committee, finance‐trained directors improve firm value almost five times to that of firms with independent audit committee alone.
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Citations
Cites
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
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Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value
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Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature
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A Simple Approximation of Tobin's q
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Do outside directors monitor managers?
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Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments
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Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature
Weisbach, M. S., & Hermalin, B. E. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.233111 · Cited by 1,177
Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?
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Board Characteristics and Audit Fees*
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Cited by
Shaukat, A., Qiu, Y., & Trojanowski, G. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2460-9 · Cited by 763
Bătae, O. M., Dragomir, V. D., & Feleagă, L. (2021) · Journal of Cleaner Production · doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.125791 · Cited by 432
Grove, H., Patelli, L., Victoravich, L. M., & Xu, P. T. (2011) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00882.x · Cited by 403
Post, C., Rahman, N., & McQuillen, C. (2015) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-014-2231-7 · Cited by 381
Appuhami, R., & Bhuyan, M. (2015) · Managerial Auditing Journal · doi:10.1108/maj-04-2014-1022 · Cited by 100
Metadata
- Authors
- Chan, K. C., & Li, J.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-01
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 16-31
- ISSN
- 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8683
- OpenAlex
- W2043416774
- Cited by
- 282
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 36.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Chan, K. C., & Li, J. (2008). Audit Committee and Firm Value: Evidence on Outside Top Executives as Expert‐Independent Directors. Corporate Governance: An International Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00662.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.