The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Contest to the Control in European Family Firms: How Other Shareholders Affect Firm Value
Abstract
Manuscript type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This paper analyses the influence of large shareholders on firm value using a sample of firms from 11 European countries, specifically considering how the existence of a controlling coalition in family‐owned firms and the contestability of control of the largest shareholder affect the value of the family‐owned firms. Research Findings/Insights: We find that increased contestability of the control of the largest shareholder increases the value of family‐owned firms. Results also show that in firms in which the largest shareholder is a family, a second family shareholder reduces firm value. Conversely, an institutional investor as second shareholder increases firm value. Likewise, better legal protection of shareholders not members of the controlling coalition increases the value of family firms. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We explore an under‐examined aspect of agency conflict – contestability between large, dominant shareholders and minority shareholders. We highlight the role of the second and third largest shareholders, in terms of share and type of shareholder. We suggest the need for new avenues of research focused on the dynamics of power within the firm. Finally, we identify a situation in which conflict of interest becomes prominent. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study corroborates policymakers' concerns regarding the protection of rights of minority shareholders. We suggest the need for a stronger macro governance environment to facilitate minority shareholder participation in corporate decision making. Our study also lends support to balanced ownership structures with multiple large shareholders as a way to increase the firm's performance. Managers would also better serve shareholders' interests by not limiting their attention to the current controlling coalition.
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Citations
Cites
Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4076(98)00009-8 · Cited by 22,571
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1995) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.1995.9517 · Cited by 14,755
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
Jensen (Deceased), M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1998) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.94043 · Cited by 2,749
Power in Top Management Teams: Dimensions, Measurement, and Validation
Finkelstein, S. (1992) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/256485 · Cited by 2,389
Moral mazes: The world of corporate managers
Jackall, R. (1988) · International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society · doi:10.1007/bf01390690 · Cited by 1,296
Cited by
The Behavioral Theory of the Firm: Assessment and Prospects
Gavetti, G., Greve, H. R., Levinthal, D. A., & Ocasio, W. C. (2012) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.1080/19416520.2012.656841 · Cited by 897
The Influence of Family Ownership on the Quality of Accounting Information
Cascino, S., Pugliese, A., Mussolino, D., & Sansone, C. (2010) · Family Business Review · doi:10.1177/0894486510374302 · Cited by 322
Metadata
- Authors
- Jara‐Bertin, M., López‐Iturriaga, F. J., & López‐de‐Foronda, Ó.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-05
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 146-159
- ISSN
- 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8683
- OpenAlex
- W2062722861
- Cited by
- 167
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 11.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Jara‐Bertin, M., López‐Iturriaga, F. J., & López‐de‐Foronda, Ó. (2008). The Contest to the Control in European Family Firms: How Other Shareholders Affect Firm Value. Corporate Governance: An International Review. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2008.00677.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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