The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CEO Compensation and Corporate Governance in China
Abstract
Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Questions: This study investigates the determination of Chinese CEO pay. We focus on three related questions: (1) Is Chinese CEO pay related to firm performance? (2) Are CEO pay dynamics important? (3) Does corporate governance affect CEO pay and equity incentives in C hina? Research Findings: Using data on CEO compensation in C hina's public traded firms from 2000 to 2010, we document significant changes in CEO pay, ownership and board structure. We document that CEO pay is positively correlated to both accounting and stock market performance, although the link to accounting performance is more robust. We find that CEO pay dynamics are important as pay in the current year is significantly positively correlated to CEO pay the previous year. We also find that CEO equity ownership and equity grants are influenced by board and ownership structure. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study supplements the standard agency theory approach to executive compensation with insights gained from the dynamics of wage setting theory developed in the labor economics field. It predicts that incomplete information and learning lead to adjustment costs and non‐instantaneous changes in CEO pay. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to policy makers interested in enhancing the design of executive compensation and internal corporate governance within transition economies.
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Cites
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Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
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Cited by
Jeong, S.-H., & Harrison, D. A. (2017) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.5465/amj.2014.0716 · Cited by 429
Metadata
- Authors
- Conyon, M. J., & He, L.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-09-18
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 575-592
- ISSN
- 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8683
- OpenAlex
- W3121472508
- Cited by
- 185
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 34.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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