The Illusion of Morality as Self-Interest: A Reason to Cooperate in Social Dilemmas
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Abstract
One reason for people's voluntary cooperation in social dilemmas, or altruistic behavior in general, may be their belief that altruism pays off in terms of long-run self-interest Although this is often true, it is typically false in large-scale social dilemmas among strangers In three questionnaire studies, subjects endorsed this self-interest illusion frequently for large-scale dilemmas, such as overfishing and pollution, in which the benefits of cooperation are delayed.
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Cites
Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice
Thaler, R. (1985) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.4.3.199 · Cited by 4,885
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
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The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.
Yamagishi, T. (1986) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110 · Cited by 1,359 · cited 1×
“In fact, the self-interest justification for political action is usually insufficient to motivate it, but political action is easier to justify when the interests of larger groups are considered (Baron, in press; Yamagishi, 1986).”
BackgroundDecision rules and the search for a dominance structure: Towards a process model of decision making
Montgomery, H. (1983) · Advances in Psychology · doi:10.1016/s0166-4115(08)62243-8 · Cited by 464
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Male, female: The evolution of human sex differences.
Geary, D. C. (1998) · American Psychological Association eBooks · doi:10.1037/10370-000 · Cited by 974
The origin of mind: Evolution of brain, cognition, and general intelligence.
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Intergroup conflict: individual, group, and collective interests
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Metadata
- Authors
- Baron, J.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1997-07
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 330-335
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W1990108142
- Cited by
- 56
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 3.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Baron, J. (1997). The Illusion of Morality as Self-Interest: A Reason to Cooperate in Social Dilemmas. Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1997.tb00448.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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