The DOI matches its Crossref record; 38 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Optimal Predictions in Everyday Cognition
Abstract
Human perception and memory are often explained as optimal statistical inferences that are informed by accurate prior probabilities. In contrast, cognitive judgments are usually viewed as following error-prone heuristics that are insensitive to priors. We examined the optimality of human cognition in a more realistic context than typical laboratory studies, asking people to make predictions about the duration or extent of everyday phenomena such as human life spans and the box-office take of movies. Our results suggest that everyday cognitive judgments follow the same optimal statistical principles as perception and memory, and reveal a close correspondence between people's implicit probabilistic models and the statistics of the world.
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Cites
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Judgment under uncertainty: Causality and attribution
Kahneman, D. J., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982) · Cited by 4,670
Probability theory the logic of science
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Probability Theory: The Logic of Science
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Advances in neural information processing systems 11
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Cited by
The trouble with overconfidence.
Moore, D. A., & Healy, P. J. (2008) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.115.2.502 · Cited by 2,358
Probabilistic machine learning and artificial intelligence
Ghahramani, Z. (2015) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature14541 · Cited by 1,995
Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H. (2009) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x · Cited by 1,801
How to grow a mind: Statistics, structure, and abstraction
Tenenbaum, J. B., Kemp, C., Griffiths, T. L., & Goodman, N. D. (2011) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1192788 · Cited by 1,815
Self-citationTopics in semantic representation
Griffiths, T. L., Steyvers, M., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2007) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.114.2.211 · Cited by 1,122
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Metadata
- Authors
- Griffiths, T. L., & Tenenbaum, J. B.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2006-09
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 767-773
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2147231083
- Cited by
- 639
- References
- 38
- FWCI
- 10.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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