The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Smarter Than We Think: When Our Brains Detect That We Are Biased
Abstract
Human reasoning is often biased by stereotypical intuitions. The nature of such bias is not clear. Some authors claim that people are mere heuristic thinkers and are not aware that cued stereotypes might be inappropriate. Other authors claim that people always detect the conflict between their stereotypical thinking and normative reasoning, but simply fail to inhibit stereotypical thinking. Hence, it is unclear whether heuristic bias should be attributed to a lack of conflict detection or a failure of inhibition. We introduce a neuroscientific approach that bears on this issue. Participants answered a classic decision-making problem (the “lawyer-engineer” problem) while the activation of brain regions believed to be involved in conflict detection (anterior cingulate) and response inhibition (lateral prefrontal cortex) was monitored. Results showed that although the inhibition area was specifically activated when stereotypical responses were avoided, the conflict-detection area was activated even when people reasoned stereotypically. The findings suggest that people detect their bias when they give intuitive responses.
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Cites
Statistical parametric maps in functional imaging: A general linear approach
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Conflict monitoring and anterior cingulate cortex: an update
Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.003 · Cited by 3,623
Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious
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“Thus, people ‘‘behave against their better judgment’’ (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994, p. 819) when they give a stereotypical response: They detect that they are biased but fail to block the biased response.”
BackgroundRisk Taking in Adolescence: New Perspectives From Brain and Behavioral Science
Steinberg, L. (2007) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00475.x · Cited by 1,362
Reyna, V. F., & Farley, F. (2006) · Psychological Science in the Public Interest · doi:10.1111/j.1529-1006.2006.00026.x · Cited by 1,244 · cited 1×
“At the practical level, onemight note that educational programs intended to improve students’ decision making in risky situations (e.g., reckless driving, binge drinking, unprotected sex) have been largely ineffective (e.g., Reyna & Farley, 2006; Steinberg, 2007).”
BackgroundExplaining modulation of reasoning by belief
Goel, V., & Dolan, R. J. (2003) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(02)00185-3 · Cited by 442 · cited 9×
“A classic demonstration of the pervasive impact of intuitive operations on people’s decision making is found in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) studies of base-rate neglect.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citation
Cited by
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.05.001 · Cited by 475
Glöckner, A., & Witteman, C. (2010) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546780903395748 · Cited by 397
Intuition and Reasoning: A Dual-Process Perspective
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2010) · Psychological Inquiry · doi:10.1080/1047840x.2010.521057 · Cited by 385
Bias and Conflict: A Case for Logical Intuitions
De Neys, W. (2012) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691611429354 · Cited by 385
Metadata
- Authors
- Neys, W. D., Vartanian, O., & Goel, V.
- Venue
- Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2008-05
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 483-489
- ISSN
- 0956-7976 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9280
- OpenAlex
- W2129320919
- Cited by
- 240
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 12.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Neys, W. D., Vartanian, O., & Goel, V. (2008). Smarter Than We Think: When Our Brains Detect That We Are Biased. Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02113.x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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