The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bias and Conflict: A Case for Logical Intuitions
Abstract
Human reasoning has been characterized as often biased, heuristic, and illogical. In this article, I consider recent findings establishing that, despite the widespread bias and logical errors, people at least implicitly detect that their heuristic response conflicts with traditional normative considerations. I propose that this conflict sensitivity calls for the postulation of logical and probabilistic knowledge that is intuitive and that is activated automatically when people engage in a reasoning task. I sketch the basic characteristics of these intuitions and point to implications for ongoing debates in the field.
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Cites
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Cited by
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2019) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011 · Cited by 2,022
Pennycook, G., & Rand, D. G. (2020) · Journal of Personality · doi:10.1111/jopy.12476 · Cited by 879
On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit
Pennycook, G., Allan Cheyne, J., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2015) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500006999 · Cited by 536
What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.05.001 · Cited by 475
Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory
Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2017) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.014 · Cited by 346
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- De Neys, W.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2012-01
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 28-38
- ISSN
- 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6924
- OpenAlex
- W2109978697
- Cited by
- 385
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 15.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.