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Cited by 276

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Time-Consistent Public Policy

KLEIN, PAUL, KRUSELL, PER, RÍOS-RULL, JOSÉ-VÍCTOR·2008·Review of Economic Studies
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00491.x
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Abstract

In this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure. We characterize and solve for Markov-perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments. The characterization consists of an inter-temporal first-order condition (a “generalized Euler equation”) for the government, and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations. For a calibrated economy, we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income—an inelastic source of funds at any point in time—the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates. We also find that when the only tax base is labour income the Markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the Ramsey equilibrium.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 21 references

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. AZZIMONTI-RENZO M., 2006, "Optimal Policy and (the Lack of) Time Inconsistency: Insights from Simple Models"
  2. 10.1086/261706 · doi:10.1086/261706
  3. CURRIE D. A., 1993, Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Contracts, 10.1017/CBO9780511599170 · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511599170
  4. 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.011 · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.011
  5. KLEIN P., 2005, Advances in Macroeconomics
  6. 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00107 · doi:10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00107
  7. MARTIN F, 2006, "Optimal Taxation Without Commitment"
  8. 10.1111/1468-0262.00255 · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00255
  9. P.D.G. SARTE, M. AZZIMONTI-RENZO, and J SOARES . (2003 ), "Optimal Public Investment With and Without Government Commitment" (Frb Richmond Working Paper 03-10). · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2184515
  10. 10.1006/redy.2000.0122 · doi:10.1006/redy.2000.0122

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
KLEIN, P., KRUSELL, P., & RÍOS-RULL, J.-V.
Venue
Review of Economic Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2008-07
Volume
75
Issue
3
Pages
789-808
ISSN
  • 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-937X
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00491.x
OpenAlex
W1972080248
Cited by
276
References
21
FWCI
41.71
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Time-Consistent Public Policy. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00491.x
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KLEIN, P., KRUSELL, P., & RÍOS-RULL, J.-V. (2008). Time-Consistent Public Policy. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00491.x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.