The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
Abstract
This paper investigates pure strategy sequential equilibria of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static optimization problems embedded in extremal equilibria. A succession of propositions, central among which is "self-generation, " allow properties of constrained efficient supergame equilibria to be deduced from the solutions of the static problems. The authors show that the latter include solutions having a "bang-bang" property; this affords a significant simplification of the equilibria that need be considered. These results apply to a broad class of asymmetric games, thereby generalizing their earlier work on optimal cartel equilibria. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.
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Cites
Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes.
Freimer, M., & Howard, R. A. (1961) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2282268 · Cited by 3,378
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
Shapley, L. S. (1953) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.39.10.1095 · Cited by 2,382
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Green, E. J., & Porter, R. H. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911462 · Cited by 1,998
Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912767 · Cited by 1,692
Stochastic optimal control : the discrete time case
Bertsekas, D. P., & Shreve, S. E. (2007) · Cited by 1,654
Integrals of set-valued functions
Aumann, R. J. (1965) · Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications · doi:10.1016/0022-247x(65)90049-1 · Cited by 1,297
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
Abreu, D. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911077 · Cited by 1,252
Self-citationThe Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
Fudenberg, D., Levine, D., & Maskin, E. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951505 · Cited by 767
Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E. (1986) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1 · Cited by 665
Self-citation
Cited by
(1998) · doi:10.1006/jeth.1997.2357 · Cited by 696
The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
Friedman*, E. J., & Resnick, P. (2001) · Journal of Economics & Management Strategy · doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00173.x · Cited by 536
Athey, S., Bagwell, K., & Sanchirico, C. (2004) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/0034-6527.00286 · Cited by 371
KLEIN, P., KRUSELL, P., & RÍOS-RULL, J.-V. (2008) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00491.x · Cited by 276
The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from eBay
Cabral, L., & Hortacsu, A. (2004) · doi:10.3386/w10363 · Cited by 149
Metadata
- Authors
- Abreu, D., Pearce, D., & Stacchetti, E.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1990-09
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1041
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2138757993
- Cited by
- 1,203
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 11.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
