EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF MORALITY AND THE MANIPULATIVE USE OF SIGNALS
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Abstract. Several attempts have recently been made to explain moral systems and moral sentiments in light of evolutionary biological theory. It may be helpful to modify and extend this project with the help of a theory of communication developed by ethologists. The core of this approach is the idea that signals are best seen as attempts to manipulate others rather than as attempts to inform them. This addition helps to clarify some problematic areas in the evolutionary study of morals, and it generates new, testable predictions about moral statements.
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The greater the costs of religious participation, the more honestly the participation signals allegiance to the religious in-group.
“The greater the costs of religious participation, the more honestly the participation signals allegiance to the religious in-group.”
From Parasite-stress promotes in-group assortative sociality: The cases of strong family ties and heightened religiosity (2012) · cites this paper as Cronk 1994
The available passages from our copy are chiefly References; none discusses the costs of religious participation as a signal of allegiance to a religious in-group. Searches for religious participation, costly rituals, and costly signals did not locate a passage addressing that relationship, so the claim cannot be verified from our copy. (LLM, conf=0.68)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredMembership in a religious group is necessary for individuals to accrue certain social benefits not accessible independently, and engaging in religious behavior is a signal of in-group allegiance to other individuals.
“The researchers using costly-signaling theory propose that membership in a religious group is necessary for individuals to accrue certain social benefits not accessible independently, and that engaging in religious behavior is a signal of in-group allegiance to other individuals (both in-group and out-group individuals).”
From Parasite-stress promotes in-group assortative sociality: The cases of strong family ties and heightened religiosity (2012) · cites this paper as Cronk 1994
The available Abstract (page not given) discusses moral statements as signals that may manipulate others, but does not address religious-group membership or its benefits. Searches for religious affiliation, group benefits, and in-group allegiance returned only references or general material, not the article’s substantive discussion. The claim cannot be verified from our copy. (LLM, conf=0.72)
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Cites
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Cooperation and Commune Longevity: A Test of the Costly Signaling Theory of Religion
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- Authors
- Cronk1, L.
- Affiliations
- Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science
- Venue
- Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science
- Publisher
- Open Library of the Humanities
- Published
- 1994-03-02
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 0591-2385 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9744
- OpenAlex
- W1995456016
- Cited by
- 149
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 14 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 11
- FWCI
- 1.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Zygon® (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Keywords
- evolutionary theory of morality, moral sentiments, signals, manipulation, communication theory, ethology, moral statements
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