Cited by 323Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

God’s punishment and public goods: A test of the supernatural punishment hypothesis in 186 world cultures

Johnson, Dominic D. P.·2005·Human Nature

Abstract

Cooperation towards public goods relies on credible threats of punishment to deter cheats. However, punishing is costly, so it remains unclear who incurred the costs of enforcement in our evolutionary past. Theoretical work suggests that human cooperation may be promoted if people believe in supernatural punishment for moral transgressions. This theory is supported by new work in cognitive psychology and by anecdotal ethnographic evidence, but formal quantitative tests remain to be done. Using data from 186 societies around the globe, I test whether the likelihood of supernatural punishment-indexed by the importance of moralizing "high gods"-is associated with cooperation.

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Crossref · 10.1007/s12110-005-1017-0

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  • Dominic Johnson's survey of 186 people groups showed an extremely high correlation between cooperation and belief in moralizing high gods.

    “Finally, Dominic Johnson ' s survey of 186 people groups showed an extremely high correlation between cooperation and belief in moralizing high gods (2005: 410 -446).”

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Authors
Johnson, D. D. P.
Affiliations
Princeton University (US)
Corresponding author
Johnson, Dominic D. P.
Venue
Human Nature
Published
2005-12
Volume
16
Issue
4
Pages
410-446
ISSN
  • 1045-6767 (ISSN-L)
  • 1936-4776
OpenAlex
W2004532904
Cited by
323
References
100
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 15 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 18 · 2016: 16 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 23 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 17
FWCI
13.36
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Human Nature (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
supernatural punishment, public goods, cooperation, religious beliefs, enforcement costs, cross-cultural comparison, evolution of cooperation

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