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Cited by 643

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 86 of the 86 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation

Open access
FELD, LARS P., FREY, BRUNO S.·2007·Law & Policy

Abstract

A psychological tax contract goes beyond the traditional deterrence model and explains tax morale as a complicated interaction between taxpayers and the government. As a contractual relationship implies duties and rights for each contract party, tax compliance is increased by sticking to the fiscal exchange paradigm between citizens and the state. Citizens are willing to honestly declare income even if they do not receive a full public good equivalent to tax payments as long as the political process is perceived to be fair and legitimate. Moreover, friendly treatment of taxpayers by the tax office in auditing processes increases tax compliance.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1467-9930.2007.00248.x

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Metadata

Authors
FELD, L. P., & FREY, B. S.
Venue
Law & Policy
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2007-01
Volume
29
Issue
1
Pages
102-120
ISSN
  • 0265-8240
  • 1467-9930
OpenAlex
W3122827591
Cited by
643
References
86
FWCI
51.82
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2007.00248.x
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FELD, L. P., & FREY, B. S. (2007). Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation. Law & Policy. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.2007.00248.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.