The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Recent experimental findings by Knobe and others (Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the significance of these findings has been overstated. My discussion is two-pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the significance of these experimental findings for the nature of the concept of intentional action cannot be determined. Unfortunately, the lack of progress in the philosophy of concepts casts doubt on whether such a consensual theory will be found. Second, I propose a new, deflationary interpretation of these experimental findings, ‘the trade-off hypothesis’, and I present several new experimental findings that support this interpretation.
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Cites
ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX
Chomsky, N. (1964) · doi:10.21236/ad0616323 · Cited by 13,587
Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology
Block, N., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1986) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00558.x · Cited by 775
A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
HAUSER, M., CUSHMAN, F., YOUNG, L., KANG‐XING JIN, R., & MIKHAIL, J. (2007) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00297.x · Cited by 666
Cited by
Person as scientist, person as moralist
Knobe, J. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000907 · Cited by 375
Innocent intentions: A correlation between forgiveness for accidental harm and neural activity☆
Young, L., & Saxe, R. (2009) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.03.020 · Cited by 249
“The correct interpretation of the side-effect effect remains controversial (e.g., Machery, 2008).”
BackgroundDoris, J. M., & The Moral Psychology Research Group (2010) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001 · Cited by 227
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
Metadata
- Authors
- MACHERY, E.
- Venue
- Mind & Language
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-03-12
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 165-189
- ISSN
- 0268-1064 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0017
- OpenAlex
- W1987770275
- Cited by
- 135
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 6.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- MACHERY, E. (2008). The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues. Mind & Language. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00336.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.