The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?1
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The word "concept" is used in various ways; its sense is sometimes psychological, sometimes logical, and sometimes perhaps a confused mixture of both.(Gottlob Frege 1892a, p. 42) What is a concept?Philosophers have given many different answers to this question, reflecting a wide variety of approaches to the study of mind and language.Nonetheless, at the most general level, there are two dominant frameworks in contemporary philosophy.One proposes that concepts are mental representations, while the other proposes that they are abstract objects.This paper looks at the differences between these two approaches, the prospects for combining them, and the issues that are involved in the dispute.We argue that powerful motivations have been offered in support of both frameworks.This suggests the possibility of combining the two.Unlike Frege, we hold that the resulting position is perfectly coherent and well worth considering.Nonetheless, we argue that it should be rejected along with the view that concepts are abstract objects-the two have a shared failing-and that the mental representation framework is to be preferred.Here is how we proceed.In sections 1 and 2, we introduce the two frameworks and briefly review their supporting motivations.Next, in section 3 we show how mental representations and abstract objects can be combined into a unified theory of concepts-what we call the Mixed View.Much of the rest
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Cites
How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226218526.001.0001 · Cited by 2,268
Can animals recall the past and plan for the future?
Clayton, N. S., Bussey, T. J., & Dickinson, A. (2003) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn1180 · Cited by 658
The Algebraic Mind: Integrating Connectionism and Cognitive Science
Marcus, G. F. (2001) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1187.001.0001 · Cited by 341
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Context and implementation: A concept analysis towards conceptual maturity
Pfadenhauer, L. M., Mozygemba, K., Gerhardus, A., Hofmann, B., Booth, A., Lysdahl, K. B., Tummers, M., Burns, J., & Rehfuess, E. A. (2015) · Zeitschrift für Evidenz, Fortbildung und Qualität im Gesundheitswesen · doi:10.1016/j.zefq.2015.01.004 · Cited by 189
Symbol Emergence in Cognitive Developmental Systems: A Survey
Taniguchi, T., Piater, J., Worgotter, F., Ugur, E., Hoffmann, M., Jamone, L., Nagai, T., Rosman, B., Matsuka, T., Iwahashi, N., et al. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Cognitive and Developmental Systems · doi:10.1109/tcds.2018.2867772 · Cited by 92
“sponds to an internal (memory) representation of classes of things [34]–[36].”
The instrumental value of conceptual frameworks in educational technology research
Antonenko, P. D. (2015) · Educational Technology Research and Development · doi:10.1007/s11423-014-9363-4 · Cited by 81
Metadata
- Authors
- Margolis, E., & Laurence, S.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-10-25
- Volume
- 41
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 561-593
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W2351488874
- Cited by
- 183
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 5.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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