Cursed Equilibrium
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
There is evidence that people do not fully take into account how other people's actions depend on these other people's information. This paper defines and applies a new equilibrium concept in games with private information, cursed equilibrium, which assumes that each player correctly predicts the distribution of other players' actions, but underestimates the degree to which these actions are correlated with other players' information. We apply the concept to common-values auctions, where cursed equilibrium captures the widely observed phenomenon of the winner's curse, and to bilateral trade, where cursedness predicts trade in adverse-selections settings for which conventional analysis predicts no trade. We also apply cursed equilibrium to voting and signalling models. We test a single-parameter variant of our model that embeds Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a special case and find that parameter values that correspond to cursedness fit a broad range of experimental datasets better than the parameter value that corresponds to Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
(2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.2.i · Cited by 8,218
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (1995) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1995.1023 · Cited by 2,545
Information, trade and common knowledge
Milgrom, P., & Stokey, N. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90046-1 · Cited by 1,729
Myles, G. D. (1993) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/0176-2680(93)90012-j · Cited by 875
7. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research
Kagel, J. H. (1995) · The Handbook of Experimental Economics · doi:10.1515/9780691213255-009 · Cited by 785
Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting
Feddersen, T., & Pesendorfer, W. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585926 · Cited by 725
Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
Feddersen, T. J., & Pesendorfer, W. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171878 · Cited by 685
Thaler, R. H. (1988) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.2.1.191 · Cited by 534
I Won the Auction But Don't Want the Prize
Bazerman, M. H., & Samuelson, W. F. (1983) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002783027004003 · Cited by 311
Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse
Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (2009) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400830138 · Cited by 268
Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections
Dekel, E., & Piccione, M. (2000) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262110 · Cited by 212
Learning to play Bayesian games
Dekel, E., Drew Fudenberg, B., & Levine, D. K. (2003) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00121-0 · Cited by 195
Research in experimental economics
(2010) · Research in Experimental Economics · doi:10.1108/s0193-2306(2010)0000013013 · Cited by 179
Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations
Jehiel, P., & Koessler, F. (2008) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.006 · Cited by 168
An evaluation of learning in the bilateral winner's curse
Ball, S. B., Bazerman, M. H., & Carroll, J. S. (1991) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/0749-5978(91)90002-b · Cited by 147
Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-bid Auctions
Forsythe, R. S., Isaac, R. M., & Palfrey, T. R. (1989) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555690 · Cited by 73
(In)accuracy of a European political stock market: The influence of common value structures
Jacobsen, B., Potters, J., Schram, A. J. H. C., van Winden, F. A. A. M., & Wit, J. (2000) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00081-6 · Cited by 41
Cited by
A Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality *
Gabaix, X. (2014) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qju024 · Cited by 683
Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications
Crawford, V. P., Costa-Gomes, M. A., & Iriberri, N. (2013) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.51.1.5 · Cited by 505
Hirshleifer, D. (2015) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-092214-043752 · Cited by 497
Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation
Skreta, V., & Veldkamp, L. (2009) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.04.006 · Cited by 460
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Li, S. (2017) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20160425 · Cited by 439
Metadata
- Authors
- Eyster, E., & Rabin, M.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2005-09
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1623-1672
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W4251530592
- Cited by
- 405
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 12.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.