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Cited by 725

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting

Feddersen, Timothy, Pesendorfer, Wolfgang·1998·American Political Science Review

Abstract

It is often suggested that requiring juries to reach a unanimous verdict reduces the probability of convicting an innocent defendant while increasing the probability of acquitting a guilty defendant. We construct a model that demonstrates how strategic voting by jurors undermines this basic intuition. We show that the unanimity rule may lead to a high probability of both kinds of error and that the probability of convicting an innocent defendant may actually increase with the size of the jury. Finally, we demonstrate that a wide variety of voting rules, including simple majority rule, lead to much lower probabilities of both kinds of error.

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Metadata

Authors
Feddersen, T., & Pesendorfer, W.
Venue
American Political Science Review
Published
1998-03
Volume
92
Issue
1
Pages
23-35
ISSN
  • 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5943
OpenAlex
W1974873962
Cited by
725
References
12
FWCI
169.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/2585926
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Feddersen, T., & Pesendorfer, W. (1998). Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting. American Political Science Review. https://doi.org/10.2307/2585926

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.