The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting
Abstract
It is often suggested that requiring juries to reach a unanimous verdict reduces the probability of convicting an innocent defendant while increasing the probability of acquitting a guilty defendant. We construct a model that demonstrates how strategic voting by jurors undermines this basic intuition. We show that the unanimity rule may lead to a high probability of both kinds of error and that the probability of convicting an innocent defendant may actually increase with the size of the jury. Finally, we demonstrate that a wide variety of voting rules, including simple majority rule, lead to much lower probabilities of both kinds of error.
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Cites
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. S. (1996) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082796 · Cited by 1,062
Young, H. P. (1988) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1961757 · Cited by 746
The Swing Voter's CursePreprint
Feddersen, T. J., & Pesendorfer, W. (1995) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 651
Self-citationVoting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
Feddersen, T. J., & Pesendorfer, W. (1997) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171878 · Cited by 607
Self-citationKalven, H., & Zeisel, H. (1971) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 543
The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes
Ladha, K. K. (1992) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111584 · Cited by 473
Information Pooling and Group Decision Making
Grofman, B. (1986) · Cited by 306
Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Myerson, R. B. (1998) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1006/game.1997.0610 · Cited by 179
Steinberg, H. B., Kalven, H., & Zeisel, H. (1966) · Harvard Law Review · doi:10.2307/1339330 · Cited by 56
The jury: trial and error in the American courtroom
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.32-3002 · Cited by 40
Cited by
The Handbook of Organizational Economics
(2013) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400845354 · Cited by 659
Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science
(2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511921452 · Cited by 611
Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem
List, C., & Goodin, R. E. (2001) · Journal of Political Philosophy · doi:10.1111/1467-9760.00128 · Cited by 601
The Robust Beauty of Majority Rules in Group Decisions.
Hastie, R., & Kameda, T. (2005) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.112.2.494 · Cited by 462
Innovating Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative Turn
Goodin, R. E. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199547944.001.0001 · Cited by 457
Metadata
- Authors
- Feddersen, T., & Pesendorfer, W.
- Venue
- American Political Science Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1998-03
- Volume
- 92
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 23-35
- ISSN
- 0003-0554 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5943
- OpenAlex
- W1974873962
- Cited by
- 725
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 169.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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