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Cited by 452

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Fairness and Contract Design

Open access
Fehr, Ernst, Klein, Alexander, Schmidt, Klaus M · 2007 · Econometrica

Abstract

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players, but trust contracts that pay a generous wage up front are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. These results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness, and incentives.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.x

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Metadata

Authors
Fehr, E., Klein, A., & Schmidt, K. M.
Venue
Econometrica
Published
2007-01
Volume
75
Issue
1
Pages
121-154
ISSN
  • 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0262
OpenAlex
W2140942578
Cited by
452
References
42
FWCI
90.22
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Fairness and Contract Design. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.x
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Fehr, E., Klein, A., & Schmidt, K. M. (2007). Fairness and Contract Design. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.