The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Fairness and Contract Design
Open accessAbstract
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players, but trust contracts that pay a generous wage up front are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. These results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness, and incentives.
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Citations
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Cited by
Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?
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Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity
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Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
SUTTER, M., HAIGNER, S., & KOCHER, M. G. (2010) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2010.00608.x · Cited by 542
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., Klein, A., & Schmidt, K. M.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2007-01
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 121-154
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2140942578
- Cited by
- 452
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 90.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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