Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model
Abstract
The authors find that subjects' behavior in an incomplete-information, repeated-game experiment is roughly a sequent ial equilibrium. The deviations from sequential equilibrium can be ex plained by the existence of a "homemade prior" probability (about 1 7 percent) that players will cooperate even when they should not. The authors conclude that equilibrium concepts which are more complicate d than Nash (such as sequential) can describe individual behavior wel l enough that theories using such equilibrium concepts are plausible. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.
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A healthy economy is sustained by trust among economic actors.
“A healthy economy is sustained by trust among economic actors1–3.”
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- Authors
- Camerer, C., & Weigelt, K.
- ORCID
- Camerer, Colin
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 1988-01
- Volume
- 56
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2079053008
- Cited by
- 572
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 18 · 2012: 28
- FWCI
- 30.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Econometrica (publishedVersion)
- CaltechAUTHORS (California Institute of Technology) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Keywords
- sequential equilibrium, reputation, repeated games, incomplete information, cooperation, equilibrium concepts, Nash equilibrium, experimental economics
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