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Cited by 336

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector

Open access
Delfgaauw, Josse, Dur, Robert·2008·The Economic Journal
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02108.x
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Abstract

Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to this stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under different informational assumptions. When civil servants’ effort is unverifiable, lazy workers find working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out dedicated workers. When effort is verifiable, a cost‐minimising government optimally attracts dedicated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by offering separating contracts, which are both distorted.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02108.x

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Metadata

Authors
Delfgaauw, J., & Dur, R.
Venue
The Economic Journal
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2007-12-20
Volume
118
Issue
525
Pages
171-191
ISSN
  • 0013-0133 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0297
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02108.x
OpenAlex
W3122375241
Cited by
336
References
37
FWCI
52.07
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02108.x
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Delfgaauw, J., & Dur, R. (2008). Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector. The Economic Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02108.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.