Cited by 2,913Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsEconomic Theory and Institutions

Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation

Benabou, Roland, Tirole, Jean·2003·Review of Economic Studies

Abstract

A central tenet of economics is that individuals respond to incentives. For psychologists and sociologists, in contrast, rewards and punishments are often counterproductive, because they undermine “intrinsic motivation”. We reconcile these two views, showing how performance incentives offered by an informed principal (manager, teacher, parent) can adversely impact an agent's (worker, child) perception of the task, or of his own abilities. Incentives are then only weak reinforcers in the short run, and negative reinforcers in the long run. We also study the effects of empowerment, help and excuses on motivation, as well as situations of ego bashing reflecting a battle for dominance within a relationship.

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Crossref · 10.1111/1467-937x.00253

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57 of 57 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Authors
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J.
Venue
Review of Economic Studies
Published
2003-07
Volume
70
Issue
3
Pages
489-520
ISSN
  • 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-937X
OpenAlex
W2124203762
Cited by
2,913
References
57
Citations by year
2026: 77 · 2025: 100 · 2024: 92 · 2023: 119 · 2022: 110 · 2021: 148 · 2020: 140 · 2019: 149 · 2018: 165 · 2017: 149 · 2016: 161 · 2015: 194 · 2014: 179 · 2013: 163 · 2012: 132
FWCI
212.10
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • The Review of Economic Studies (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Toulouse 1 Capitole Publications (Université Toulouse I Capitole) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
Keywords
intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, performance-based incentives, reward and punishment, principal-agent problem, task perception, self-efficacy, negative reinforcement, empowerment, excuses

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