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ON BUYING LEGISLATURES*
Abstract
This paper analyzes a simple spatial voting model that includes lobbyists who are able to buy votes on bills to change the status quo. The key results are: (i) if lobbyists can discriminate across legislators when buying votes, then they will pay the largest bribes to legislators who are slightly opposed to the proposed change, rather than to legislators who strongly support or strongly oppose the change; (ii) equilibrium policies exist, and with quadratic preferences these equilibria always lie between the average of the lobbyists' ideal points and the median of the legislators' ideal points; and (iii) “moderate” lobbyists, whose positions on a policy issue are close to the median of the legislators' ideal points, will prefer the issue to be salient, while more extreme lobbyists will generally prefer the issue to be obscure.
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Citations
Cited by
Dal Bo, E. (2006) · Oxford Review of Economic Policy · doi:10.1093/oxrep/grj013 · Cited by 960
Groseclose, T., & Snyder, J. M. (1996) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2082886 · Cited by 428
Self-citationThe Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis
Mian, A., Sufi, A., & Trebbi, F. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.5.1967 · Cited by 375
Long-Term Investing in Politicians; Or, Give Early, Give Often
Snyder (1992) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467243 · Cited by 356
The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting
Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J. M., & III, C. S. (2001) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.2307/440269 · Cited by 324
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Snyder, J. M.
- Venue
- Economics & Politics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1991-07
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 93-109
- ISSN
- 0954-1985 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0343
- OpenAlex
- W2010050173
- Cited by
- 247
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 8.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.