The DOI matches its Crossref record; 50 of the 50 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Regulatory Capture: A Review
Abstract
This article reviews both the theoretical and empirical literatures on regulatory capture. The scope is broad, but utility regulation is emphasized. I begin by describing the Stigler–Peltzman approach to the economics of regulation. I then open the black box of influence and regulatory discretion using a three-tier hierarchical agency model under asymmetric information (in the spirit of Laffont and Tirole, 1993). I discuss alternative modelling approaches with a view to a richer set of positive predictions, including models of common agency, revolving doors, informational lobbying, coercive pressure, and influence over committees. I discuss empirical work involving capture and regulatory outcomes. I also review evidence on the revolving-door phenomenon and on the impact that different methods for selecting regulators appear to have on regulatory outcomes. The last section contains open questions for future research.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
The Theory of Economic Regulation
Stigler, G. J. (2021) · The Political Economy · doi:10.4324/9781315495811-8 · Cited by 5,483
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
Peltzman, S. (1976) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466865 · Cited by 4,729
A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence
Becker, G. S. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1886017 · Cited by 4,117
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_7 · Cited by 3,302
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Jean Tirole, Z., & Laffont, J. (1993) · Toulouse Capitole Publications (University Toulouse 1 Capitole) · Cited by 3,154
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097524 · Cited by 2,366
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control
(1987) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036930 · Cited by 2,224
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Cited by
Theoretical Frontiers in Representative Bureaucracy: New Directions for Research
Meier, K. J. (2019) · Perspectives on Public Management and Governance · doi:10.1093/ppmgov/gvy004 · Cited by 284
Could digital platforms capture the media through infrastructure?
Nechushtai, E. (2018) · Journalism · doi:10.1177/1464884917725163 · Cited by 135
Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool
Berry, C. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00344.x · Cited by 128
Can we learn lessons from the FDA's approval of aducanumab?
Liu, K. Y., & Howard, R. (2021) · Nature Reviews Neurology · doi:10.1038/s41582-021-00557-x · Cited by 104
Grose, C. R., Lopez, P., Sadhwani, S., & Yoshinaka, A. (2022) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/714923 · Cited by 39
Metadata
- Authors
- Dal Bo, E.
- Venue
- Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2006-06-01
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 203-225
- ISSN
- 0266-903X (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2121
- OpenAlex
- W2107912056
- Cited by
- 960
- References
- 50
- FWCI
- 33.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Regulatory Capture: A Review. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oxrep/grj013
- The paper
- Dal Bo, E. (2006). Regulatory Capture: A Review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grj013
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
