Cited by 375Political Influence and Corporate StrategiesHousing Market and EconomicsFiscal Policies and Political Economy

The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis

Mian, Atif, Sufi, Amir, Trebbi, Francesco·2010·American Economic Review

Abstract

We examine the effects of constituents, special interests, and ideology on congressional voting on two of the most significant pieces of legislation in US economic history. Representatives whose constituents experience a sharp increase in mortgage defaults are more likely to support the Foreclosure Prevention Act, especially in competitive districts. Interestingly, representatives are more sensitive to defaults of their own-party constituents. Special interests in the form of higher campaign contributions from the financial industry increase the likelihood of supporting the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. However, ideologically conservative representatives are less responsive to both constituent and special interests. (JEL D72, G21, G28)

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/aer.100.5.1967

Cites

62 of 62 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Alston Lee J, 1984, American Economic Review, 74, 445
  2. Kalt Joseph P, 1984, American Economic Review, 74, 279
  3. Kroszner Randall S, 1994, American Economic Review, 84, 810
  4. Levitt Steven D, 1996, American Economic Review, 86, 425
  5. Peltzman Sam, 1985, American Economic Review, 75, 656
  6. Romer Thomas, 1991, A. Alesina and G. Carliner, 175

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Authors
Mian, A., Sufi, A., & Trebbi, F.
Affiliations
  • University of California, Berkeley (US)
  • University of Chicago (US)
  • National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2010-12-01
Volume
100
Issue
5
Pages
1967-1998
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1971534717
Cited by
375
References
62
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 24 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 24 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 19 · 2016: 22 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 24 · 2013: 25 · 2012: 27
FWCI
71.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Housing Market and Economics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
Keywords
mortgage default, congressional voting, constituent influence, interest groups, campaign contributions, financial services, political ideology, partisanship, political responsiveness, 2008 financial crisis

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