Dictators as Founding Fathers? The Role of Constitutions Under Autocracy
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article advances a theory of why autocratic coalitions adopt constitutions. We argue that autocratic rulers adopt constitutions in the nascent stages of an autocratic coalition taking power, when uncertainty about leader intentions is high. Constitutions can serve to consolidate a new distribution of power, allowing a launching organization (LO) to codify and defend their rights. Autocratic coalitions that adopt constitutions should therefore last longer in power than those that do not. Using new data compiled on constitutions created under autocracy in Latin America from 1950 to 2002, we show that autocratic coalitions who adopt and operate under constitutions extend their survival. This result holds after controlling for the presence of other autocratic institutions, country fixed effects, and after using an instrumental variables strategy to address reverse causation. A case study of Mexico details the mechanism by which this relationship between constitutions and stability occurs.
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Citations
Cites
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Political Institutions under Dictatorship
Gandhi, J. (2008) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510090 · Cited by 1,910
Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats
Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2007) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414007305817 · Cited by 1,523 · cited 5×
“Legislatures may also enhance an autocratic regime’s survival (see Boix and Svolik, 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Wright, 2008), as may regular elections (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Magaloni, 2008).”
Influential
Cited by
Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution
Albertus, M., & Menaldo, V. (2014) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123413000124 · Cited by 242
Self-citationConstraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Meng, A. (2020) · doi:10.1017/9781108877497 · Cited by 215
Metadata
- Authors
- Albertus, M., & Menaldo, V.
- Venue
- Economics & Politics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-08-02
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 279-306
- ISSN
- 0954-1985 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0343
- OpenAlex
- W3121154980
- Cited by
- 123
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 14.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Albertus, M., & Menaldo, V. (2012). Dictators as Founding Fathers? The Role of Constitutions Under Autocracy. Economics & Politics. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2012.00402.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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