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Cited by 242Political Conflict and GovernancePolitical Theory and DemocracyNatural Resources and Economic Development

Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution

Albertus, Michael, Menaldo, Victor·2014·British Journal of Political Science
DOI 10.1017/s0007123413000124
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Abstract

Inequality and democracy are far more compatible empirically than social conflict theory predicts. This article speaks to this puzzle, identifying the scope conditions under which democratization induces greater redistribution. Because autocrats sometimes have incentives to expropriate economic elites, who lack reliable institutions to protect their rights, elites may prefer democracy to autocratic rule if they can impose roadblocks to redistribution under democracy ex ante. Using global panel data (1972–2008), this study finds that there is a relationship between democracy and redistribution only if elites are politically weak during a transition; for example, when there is revolutionary pressure. Redistribution is also greater if a democratic regime can avoid adopting and operating under a constitution written by outgoing elites and instead create a new constitution that redefines the political game. This finding holds across three different measures of redistribution and instrumental variables estimation. This article also documents the ways in which elites ‘bias’ democratic institutions.

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  • Former authoritarian elites' power extends beyond the authoritarian regime's lifespan; autocrats may capture state resources at democratic transition and use them clientelistically to stay in power.

    “Autocrats may be well positioned to capture state resources at the time of democratic transition, which they can then use in a clientelistic fashion to stay in power (Brun and Diamond 2014; Haggard and Kaufmann 2016; Albertus and Menaldo 2014).”

    From Accountability by Numbers: A New Global Transitional Justice Dataset (1946–2016) (2020) · cites this paper as Albertus and Menaldo 2014

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Authors
Albertus, M., & Menaldo, V.
Corresponding author
Albertus, Michael
ORCID
Venue
British Journal of Political Science
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2013-05-23
Volume
44
Issue
3
Pages
575-603
ISSN
  • 0007-1234 (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-2112
DOI
10.1017/s0007123413000124
OpenAlex
W3121603570
Cited by
242
References
67
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 13 · 2018: 58 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 13 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 1
FWCI
28.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified)
Locations
British Journal of Political Science (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Political Conflict and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Theory and Democracy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Natural Resources and Economic Development
Keywords
democratization, redistribution, economic elites, elite dominance, political transition, authoritarian regimes, expropriation, constitutional drafting, democratic institutions, social conflict theory

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