Which Governance Mechanisms Promote Efficiency in Reaching Poor Clients? Evidence from Rated Microfinance Institutions
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of several governance mechanisms on microfinance institutions' (MFI) performance. We first define performance as efficiency in reaching many poor clients. Following the literature on efficiency in banks, we estimate a stochastic cost frontier and measure output by the number of clients. Therefore, we capture the cost minimisation goal and the goal of serving many poor clients, both of which are pursued by MFIs. We next explore the impact of measurable governance mechanisms on the individual efficiency coefficients. The results show that efficiency increases with a board size of up to nine members and decreases after that. MFIs in which the CEO chairs the board and those with a larger proportion of insiders are less efficient. The evidence also suggests that donors' presence on the board is not beneficial. We do not find consistent evidence for the effect of competition, and we find weak evidence that MFIs in countries with mature regulatory environments reach fewer clients, while MFIs regulated by an independent banking authority are more efficient.
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Cited by
Financial performance and corporate governance in microfinance: Evidence from Asia
Iqbal, S., Nawaz, A., & Ehsan, S. (2019) · Journal of Asian Economics · doi:10.1016/j.asieco.2018.10.002 · Cited by 204
Measuring social performance in social enterprises: a global study of microfinance institutions
Beisland, L. A., Djan, K. O., Mersland, R., & Randøy, T. (2021) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-019-04417-z · Cited by 84
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Hartarska, V., & Mersland, R.
- Venue
- European Financial Management
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-03
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 218-239
- ISSN
- 1354-7798 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-036X
- OpenAlex
- W1943136123
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 54
- FWCI
- 10.36
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Hartarska, V., & Mersland, R. (2012). Which Governance Mechanisms Promote Efficiency in Reaching Poor Clients? Evidence from Rated Microfinance Institutions. European Financial Management. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-036x.2009.00524.x
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