The Moral Problem of Risk Impositions: A Survey of the Literature
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper surveys the current philosophical discussion of the ethics of risk imposition, placing it in the context of relevant work in psychology, economics and social theory. The central philosophical problem starts from the observation that it is not practically possible to assign people individual rights not to be exposed to risk, as virtually all activity imposes some risk on others. This is the ‘problem of paralysis’. However, the obvious alternative theory that exposure to risk is justified when its total benefits exceed its total costs faces the standard distributional challenges of consequentialism. Forms of contractualism have been proposed as a solution, but how exactly such theories can be formulated remains problematic, especially when confronted with the difficult cases of mass, novel, risk such as climate change.
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Citations
Cites
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 · Cited by 28,810
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497 · cited 1×
“(Sunstein 2002) His argument stems from the shortcomings in public risk perception and the difficulties in understanding probabilities that Tversky and Kahneman’s very influential work has suggested (see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1981).”
BackgroundOn the quantitative definition of risk
Kaplan, S., & Garrick, B. J. (1981) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.1981.tb01350.x · Cited by 3,103
Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics
Manson, N. C., & O'Neill, O. (2007) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511814600 · Cited by 800
Cited by
Recommender systems and their ethical challenges
Milano, S., Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L. (2020) · AI & SOCIETY · doi:10.1007/s00146-020-00950-y · Cited by 556
“The ethics of risk imposition is the subject of a growing philosophical literature, which highlights how most activities involve imposition of risks (Hansson 2010; Hayenhjelm and Wolff 2012).”
BackgroundFour Responsibility Gaps with Artificial Intelligence: Why they Matter and How to Address them
Santoni de Sio, F., & Mecacci, G. (2021) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-021-00450-x · Cited by 490
“It also ignores the moral relevance of fairness and distributive justice in assessing the moral risks of technology (Hayenhjelm & Wolff, 2012).”
BackgroundThe Ethics of Accident-Algorithms for Self-Driving Cars: an Applied Trolley Problem?
Nyholm, S., & Smids, J. (2016) · Ethical Theory and Moral Practice · doi:10.1007/s10677-016-9745-2 · Cited by 331
Democratizing Algorithmic Fairness
Wong, P.-H. (2020) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-019-00355-w · Cited by 182
Simpson, T. W., & Müller, V. C. (2016) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqv075 · Cited by 65
Metadata
- Authors
- Hayenhjelm, M., & Wolff, J.
- Venue
- European Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-10-26
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- S1
- ISSN
- 0966-8373 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0378
- OpenAlex
- W1499288804
- Cited by
- 130
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 15.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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