Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The question of strengths and weaknesses of national parliaments in EU affairs, one of the most salient in the debate on the democratic legitimacy of the EU, is generally answered by assessing formal parliamentary powers which can influence their governments' EU policy. Such an evaluation, however, is flawed: Formal mandating rights are usually incompatible with the overall logic of parliamentary systems, which explains why most national parliaments make very little use of them. Even more importantly, it unduly reduces parliamentary functions to the legislative or policy‐making function. Drawing on agency theory, it will instead be argued that the functions of public deliberation and of holding the government publicly to account are at least as important and therefore need to be included in a redefined concept of parliamentary strength. In particular, the article proposes a distinction between two different elements of accountability—monitoring and political scrutiny—which recognises parliamentary majority and opposition as two distinct agents of the electorate.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability
(2014) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199641253.001.0001 · Cited by 1,144
Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift
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“To rational principals, accountability is largely about enforcing compliance with their stipulated preferences, goals, norms and regulations (Auel 2007; Müller 2000, 327–9; Whitaker, Altman-Sauer, and Henderson 2004, 115).”
Accountability and Multi-level Governance: More Accountability, Less Democracy?
Papadopoulos, Y. (2010) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402382.2010.486126 · Cited by 287
Schmidt, V., & Wood, M. (2019) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/padm.12615 · Cited by 266
“But this logic fails to deal with the fact that in practice very few national parliaments (with the notable exception of some Northern European legislatures) are able to hold their executives to account (Auel 2007; Crum 2017; Kreilinger 2019).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Auel, K.
- Venue
- European Law Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-06-07
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 487-504
- ISSN
- 1351-5993 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0386
- OpenAlex
- W2149210618
- Cited by
- 198
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 35.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Auel, K. (2007). Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs. European Law Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00380.x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.