Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
I use a game theoretic model of diversionary war incentives to help explain the lack of a consistent empirical relationship between domestic conditions and the use of force abroad. I argue that when diversionary behavior is about demonstrating competence rather than creating a short-term “rally round the flag” effect, a leader has incentives to use force against a challenging target, and this may dissuade many would-be diversionary uses of force. I then combine the diversionary model with the bargaining approach to war and show that when war is costly and bargaining is allowed, the diversionary leader can be peacefully appeased short of war as long as the benefit of holding office is not too large compared with the cost of war and other factors. However, when the office holding benefit is sufficiently large, the diversionary incentive emerges as a new domestic politics based “rationalist explanation for war.”
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Citations
Cites
Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games
Putnam, R. D. (1988) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300027697 · Cited by 7,475
Rationalist explanations for war
Fearon, J. D. (1995) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324 · Cited by 3,995
Cited by
Leaders and International Conflict
Chiozza, G., & Goemans, H. E. (2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511996429 · Cited by 308
Jackson, M. O., & Morelli, M. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.4.1353 · Cited by 216
The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict
Wolford, S. (2007) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00280.x · Cited by 210
Which Way Out?: The Manner and Consequences of Losing Office
Goemans, H. E. (2008) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002708323316 · Cited by 169
Metadata
- Authors
- TARAR, A.
- Venue
- International Studies Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2006-03
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 169-188
- ISSN
- 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2478
- OpenAlex
- W2045769673
- Cited by
- 185
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 32.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- TARAR, A. (2006). Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War. International Studies Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00397.x
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